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ABSTRACT
Bitcoin’s popularity increased as its value increased and people became excited about the prospect of
a trustless, decentralized currency that could be used on the Internet. Within the last two years,
however, people and organizations began exploiting the potential of the block chain that powers the
bitcoin network. These people realized that the block chain—a transparent public ledger that cannot
be altered—can be used for more than digital currency. One such organization calls itself Ethereum
and its developers plan to use block chains to allow decentralized autonomous applications to operate
free of government censorship or corruption. While such a network would have a profound effect on
society—allowing trustless voting, uncensored social networking and the like—its impact on
copyrights could be devastating. This paper argues that the emerging, decentralized Internet (also
known as Web 3.0) will be the straw that breaks the copyright owner’s back. This paper argues that,
with block chain technology and decentralized applications, those buying and selling unauthorized
copies of copyrighted material cannot be subject to court injunctions; making enforcement of copyrights
nearly impossible on a decentralized Internet. This paper then proposes that copyright holders get
out in front of the problem by embracing a decentralized Internet. This can only be done by drastically
reducing the price of copyright licenses. In other words, by offering cheap licenses at the dawn of Web
3.0, copyright holders can instill a sense that it’s better to be safe than sorry when it comes to the
ongoing struggle between technology and copyrights.
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THE GREAT DECENTRALIZATION: HOW WEB 3.0 WILL WEAKEN
COPYRIGHTS
NICK VOGEL*
I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine starting over. Imagine a new Internet. Imagine that this time, however,
there is no Amazon, no Google, no Apple, no Yahoo or any of the other wealthy,
influential and ambitious corporations around which the Internet’s significant market
activity orbit. Imagine an Internet where no centralized corporation or government
has control over the content shared between users. Imagine an Internet where no one
is in charge and no one can be held responsible when something goes wrong. What
impact would such an environment have on artists’ copyrights? What impact would
this decentralized Internet have on copyright law and attorneys? Some commenters
believe the Internet faces a great movement to decentralize most online services. 1 This
article will attempt to illustrate this decentralization’s likely impact on copyright law.
Part II of this comment discusses the technological advance known as a block
chain and gives examples of some cutting edge companies that plan to maximize the
block chain’s potential.
Part II A of this comment focuses in on one particular initiative known as
Ethereum and discusses the Ethereum Foundation’s plan to decentralize the Internet.
Part II B of this comment looks at how the courts historically handled file sharing over
the Internet and the misappropriation of copyrighted material.
Part III of this comment discusses the impact decentralized applications may have
on copyrights.
Part IV proposes that creators of copyrightable material embrace a decentralized
Internet as soon as possible and offer licensing at a hyper competitive price.
The comment briefly concludes in Part V with a warning that copyrights will have
less legal effect in the realm of a decentralized Internet.
II. BACKGROUND
This section discusses the new technology allowing software applications to run
independent of any authority or centralized government or company. This section will
also discuss which parties or entities courts have traditionally held liable for copyright
infringement via the Internet.
* © Nick Vogel 2015. J.D., January 2016, The John Marshall Law School; editor in Chief of the
Decisive Utterance student newspaper from 2012 until 2015; feature writer and investigative
journalist from 2006 until 2011. I want to thank my mom and dad for raising me to love learning and
for their help and support during my journey as a law student.
1 Jamie Bartlett, Soon, the Internet will be impossible to control, THE TELEGRAPH (Dec. 10, 2014)
(http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/internet/11284538/Soon-the-internet-will-be-impossible-tocontrol.html) (reporting that, “among the hacker community an alternative way of running the
internet is being built already: an internet where no one is in control, where no one can shut you down,
where no one can manipulate your content. A decentralised internet.”).
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Before diving into this topic it is important for the reader to become familiar with
Bitcoin and the novel software technology that powers it. Bitcoin is a decentralized
digital currency that cannot be counterfeited, so to speak. 2 This means that a Bitcoin
can be transferred from one person to another, or, one computer to another, or one
smartphone to another in order to securely and confidently facilitate trade. 3 While a
digital currency holds promise for the future of commerce, most commentators
recognize the technology behind Bitcoin will revolutionize the way we social network,
trade corporate stock and even vote.4
The technology that makes Bitcoin work is called the block chain (sometimes
written as one word ‘blockchain’). 5 This is how an organization called the Bitcoin
Foundation explains what a block chain is:
The block chain is a shared public ledger on which the entire Bitcoin network
relies. All confirmed transactions are included in the block chain. This way,
Bitcoin wallets can calculate their spendable balance and new transactions
can be verified to be spending bitcoins that are actually owned by the
spender. The integrity and the chronological order of the block chain are
enforced with cryptography.6

2 Michael Sivy, The Real Significance of the Bitcoin Boom (and Bust), TIME (April 12, 2013)
(http://business.time.com/2013/04/12/the-real-significance-of-the-bitcoin-boom-and-bust/) (reporting
that “to prevent counterfeiting, (Bitcoin’s creator) attached a history of transactions to each currency
unit—but allowed users to keep their transactions nearly anonymous. Counterfeiting is hard because
fake Bitcoins would need an authenticated history to pass muster.”).
3
BITCOIN, https://bitcoin.org/en/faq#who-created-bitcoin (last visited March 29,
2015)(hereinafter “bitcoin.org”).
4 Exclusive: IBM Looking at Adopting Bitcoin Technology for Major Currencies, NEW YORK TIMES
(March
15,
2015)
(http://www.nytimes.com/reuters/2015/03/12/business/12reuters-bitcoinibm.html?_r=0) (explaining that the technology behind Bitcoin is “viewed as bitcoin's main
technological innovation, allowing users to make payments anonymously, instantly, and without
government regulation.”). Dominic Frisby, The Incredible Technology behind Bitcoin is About to
Change the World, BUSINESS INSIDER (Jan. 21, 2015) (http://www.businessinsider.com/bitcoinblockchain-technology-dominic-frisby-2015-1) (claiming that companies are using the technology
behind Bitcoin for “finding new ways to communicate and socially network without third-party
providers (the likes of Gmail, Apple, Facebook or Twitter). They’re finding ways to draft and enforce
contracts without the need for lawyers (these are known as ‘smart contracts’). They’re finding ways
to issue and trade shares – without the need for traditional stock exchanges and financiers.”); Meghan
Neal, Bitcoin could change voting the way it’s Changed Money, MOTHERBOARD (June 6, 2014)
(http://motherboard.vice.com/read/bitcoin-could-change-voting-the-way-its-changed-money)
(reporting that “Political groups and tech startups are beginning to experiment with digital voting
systems based on the bitcoin and its technological protocol.”).
5 Bitcoin.org, https://bitcoin.org/en/how-it-works (last visited May 1, 2015).
6 Id. The Bitcoin Foundation explains how private keys are used to facilitate exchanges on the
block chain,
A transaction is a transfer of value between Bitcoin wallets that gets included
in the block chain. Bitcoin wallets keep a secret piece of data called a private key or
seed, which is used to sign transactions, providing a mathematical proof that they
have come from the owner of the wallet. The signature also prevents the transaction
from being altered by anybody once it has been issued. All transactions are
broadcast between users and usually begin to be confirmed by the network in the
following 10 minutes, through a process called mining.
Id.
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In other words, because everyone can see the block chain, anyone can spot a
duplicate or fraudulent transaction. This solves the problem of an individual merely
making a digital copy of a bitcoin and holding onto it after sending the original bitcoin
to another person. Another way to understand the block chain is to look at it as a
large, public spreadsheet in which everyone has the ability to check that each digital
exchange is unique.
Bitcoin has emerged from obscurity over the past few years, and has gained
And as bitcoin became popular for its
acceptance by some mainstream financiers.
potential to disrupt the way we think of currency, enterprising individuals and groups
These
realized the potential hidden within bitcoin’s novel block chain technology.
tech savvy individuals saw that society could use the block chain to transfer and secure
more than digital currency. 2 Contracts, domain name registration, a vote for a
politician, land titles, the mining and market history of a diamond; the limit is yet
unknown. 3 One example is a company called Namecoin. Rather than transfer digital
7 Larry Greenenmeier, Bitcoin-Based Blockchain Breaks Out, SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN, (April 1,
2015) (explaining that “[o]nce a transaction is entered into the blockchain ledger, it cannot be deleted
or changed.”).
8 Rob Wile, SATOSHI'S REVOLUTION: How The Creator Of Bitcoin May Have Stumbled Onto
Something
Much,
Much
Bigger,
BUSINESS
INSIDER
(April
22,
2014)
(http://www.businessinsider.com/the-future-of-the-blockchain-2014-4) (describing what is known as
the Byzantine General’s Problem, which is a challenge “to send and receive money online without the
need for a trusted third party, such as PayPal, ensuring that the same digital credit standing in for
the amount being exchanged isn't being spent twice.”) (hereinafter “Wile”).
9 Wile (describing the blockchain as “a ledger of all transactions owned and monitored by everyone
but ultimately controlled by none. It's like a giant interactive spreadsheet everyone has access to and
updates to confirm each digital credit is unique.”).
10 E.g. Jacob Pramuk, Bitcoin Exchange Gemini Safe and Legal: Founders, CNBC (Oct. 8, 2015)
(http://www.cnbc.com/2015/10/08/bitcoin-exchange-gemini-safe-and-legal-founders.html) (reporting
the launch of a Bitcoin called Gemini. The exchange was founded by Cameron and Tyler Winklevoss.
The Winklevoss twins are reported saying that, “their platform gives hedge funds and market makers
a secure platform to dive into the digital currency.”).
11 Mathew Sparkes, The coming digital anarchy, THE TELEGRAPH (June 9, 2014)
(http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/news/10881213/The-coming-digital-anarchy.html) (reporting
that “[i]n time, blockchains will power many radical, disruptive technologies that smart people are
working on right now,” and that the, “hidden power of the Facebooks, Twitters and Googles of this
world is inspiring digital anarchists to destroy the smug, jargon-infested giants of Silicon Valley,” and
that society’s first experience with “this decentralised power happened to be a currency, Bitcoin, but
it could equally have been a stock exchange, a social network or an electronic voting system.”).
12 Andy Extance, Entrepreneur’s Explore Bitcoin’s Future, SCIENTIFIC AMERICA, (Sept. 30, 2015)
(reporting that “[m]any people see this block-chain architecture as the template for a host of other
applications, including self-enforcing contracts and secure systems for online voting and
crowdfunding.”).
13
E.g.,
IC3:
INITIATIVE
FOR
CRYPTOCURRENCIES
AND
CONTRACTS
(http://www.initc3.org/projects.html) (last viewed Oct. 8, 2015). It is the mission of IC3 to research the
possibilities of the blockchain architecture. The initiative’s Website does a good job describing the
potential of a “smart contract” on the blockchain, writing that,
Smart contracts hold great promise for the creation of new financial and legal
instruments. But they also offer new opportunities for criminal behavior.
Autonomously executing contracts for key theft, document leakage, and a variety
of real-world crimes (e.g., assassination) become a possibility. We are exploring the
risks of new criminal ecosystems arising in decentralized smart contract systems
to inform policymakers and to devise countermeasures that can be deployed in a
timely way.
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currency on Bitcoin’s block chain, Namecoin uses the block chain to register domain
names.14 By downloading Namecoin’s software, a user can then use a namecoin to
obtain a domain name with the extension “.bit.”15 A user’s claim to that name is then
preserved on the Bitcoin block chain where no one can steal it, or use it. 16 The cost
comes out to about $.10 U.S.D.17
Consider, also, the story of Leanne Kemp, an Australian. Kemp has come up with
a way she says diamonds can be tracked on a block chain.18 Kemp’s plan is to create
digital certificates detailing a diamond’s history. 19 These certificates would then be
“mapped” onto a diamond. Buyers and retailers could then use this digital certificate
to help recognize the identity of a diamond and its true value. 20
A. Decentralization Becomes a Reality
Then, there is Ethereum. First conceptualized by a 19-year-old Canadian,
Ethereum stands to become the driving force behind the looming decentralization of
the Internet.21 That 19-year-old was Vitalik Buterin and in 2011 he came up with the
idea of creating a block chain and using it to support a whole new programming
language, rather than a currency like Bitcoin. 22 Ethereum launched, officially, on July
30, 2015.23 The team of people behind Ethereum created a new operating system upon
which new applications can be created. 24 Ethereum even plans to have its own
Id.
14 NAMECOIN (https://wiki.namecoin.info/index.php?title=FAQ#How_does_Namecoin_work.3F)
(last viewed Oct. 9, 2015).
15 Id.
16 Id.
17 Id.
18 Sally Davies, Bitcoin: possible bane of the diamond thief, THE FINANCIAL TIMES (Feb. 3, 2015)
(http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/f2b0b2ee-9012-11e4-a0e5-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3X0JPOTZE).
19 Id.
20 Id.
21 Ilya Pozin, The Three Platforms that will Decentralize the Web, FORBES (Apr. 10, 2015)
(http://www.forbes.com/sites/ilyapozin/2015/04/10/meet-the-3-platforms-that-will-decentralize-theweb/2/).
22 Alexander Leishman, A Next-Generation Smart Contract and Decentralized Application
Platform, Ethereum White Paper, (https://github.com/ethereum/wiki/wiki/White-Paper) (last visited
April 14, 2015) (hereinafter “The White Paper”) (explaining that Ethereum “intends to provide a
blockchain with a built-in fully fledged Turing-complete programming language that can be used to
create ‘contracts’ that can be used to encode arbitrary state transition functions, allowing users to
create [decentralized autonomous organizations, crypto-currencies, digital assets to represent custom
currencies and financial instruments and complex applications involving having digital assets being
directly controlled by a piece of code implementing arbitrary rules], as well as many others that we
have not yet imagined, simply by writing up the logic in a few lines of code.”)
23
Stephan
Tual,
Ethereum
Launches,
Ethereum
Blog
(July
30,
2015)
https://blog.ethereum.org/2015/07/30/ethereum-launches/ (writing that the first live release of
Ethereum became available on July 30, 2015) (hereinafter “Tual”).
24 Primavera De Filippi, Tomorrow’s Apps Will Come From Brilliant (and Risky) Bitcoin Code,
WIRED (March 8, 2014) (http://www.wired.com/2014/03/decentralized-applications-built-bitcoin-greatexcept-whos-responsible-outcomes/) (explaining that “Ethereum is a contract validating and enforcing
system based on a more sophisticated platform than other derivative cryptocurrencies (it features an
internal Turing-complete scripting language that can be used to encode advanced transaction types
directly into the blockchain).”) (hereinafter “De Fillippi”). According to her biography, De Fillippi is
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decentralized application browser, similar to Google Chrome or Apple’s App store. 25
Rather than use a block chain to support a digital currency like bitcoin, Ethereum’s
block chain will contain distributed autonomous companies (also referred to as
decentralized autonomous applications)—software programs that once started, cannot
be stopped.26 With Ethereum, programs will use “smart contracts” to execute
agreements between two users, between a user and an application or between two
applications.27 Rather than rely on a court to enforce a contract, a smart contract can
enforce itself via lines of code.28 A prediction market called Augur provides an example
of how a smart contract can be used on the Ethereum network. With Augur, users bet
money predicting future events.29 That money is placed on the Ethereum network
where it cannot be released until the terms of the smart contract are satisfied or when
the event predicted comes to fruition. 30 Essentially, the users trust their money to the
software application existing on the Ethereum network to deliver the money when the
result of the bet is revealed.31 The plan for Ethereum is to use a cryptocurrency like
Bitcoin to power the smart contracts.32
Since the Ethereum network is decentralized, existing in the aggregate on the
computers of those who use the network, the only logical way to “stop” a smart contract
is to take complete control over the Ethereum network.33 Doing this would require one

“currently a research fellow at the Berkman Center for Internet & Society at Harvard Law School,
where she is investigating the legal challenges of “governance-by-design” in online distributed
architectures,
such
as
Bitcoin,
Ethereum
etc.”
See
Primavera
De
Filippi,
https://cyber.law.harvard.edu/people/pdefilippi) (last viewed Oct. 9, 2015).
25
See
Ethereum,
Ethereum
Presents
Mist,
YOUTUBE
(Nov.
12,
2014),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IgNjs_WaFSc.
26 De Fillippi (reporting that software programs will function on the blockchain “with an
autonomy of their own.”); Tual, writing in his blog that Ethereum’s vision was to create a “censorshipproof ‘world computer’ that anyone can program.”
27 See generally, The White Paper (explaining how Ethereum uses smart contracts).
28 Vitalik Buterin, DAOs Are Not Scary, Part 1: Self-Enforcing Contracts And Factum Law,
ETHEREUM BLOG (Feb. 24, 2014) https://blog.ethereum.org/2014/02/24/daos-are-not-scary-part-1-selfenforcing-contracts-and-factum-law/ (hereinafter “DAOs Are Not Scary”). Buterin provides the
following hypothetical to show how a smart contract would work on Ethereum: “[I]magine a world
where everyone has their own private key on a smartphone, and there is a car such that when you
pay $100 to a certain address the car automatically starts responding commands signed by your
private key for a day.” Id.
29 See Augur, Augur - How A Decentralized Prediction Market Works YOUTUBE (May 20, 2015),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yegyih591Jo.
30 Id.
31
Klint Finley, Out in the Open: Teenage Hacker Transforms Web into One Giant Bitcoin
Network, WIRED (Jan. 27, 2014) (http://www.wired.com/2014/01/ethereum/) (using a simple betting
system as an example of a smart contract) (hereinafter “Finley”).
32 DAOs Are Not Scary (writing that “with [digital cryptocurrencies], we have created a way for
contracts, and perhaps even law in general, to work, and be effective, without relying on any kind of
mechanism whatsoever to enforce it.”).
33 Blythe Masters Says a Bitcoin Technology Will Revolutionize Finance, BLOOMBERG NEWS,
(Sept. 1, 2015) (http://www.crainsnewyork.com/article/20150901/FINANCE/150909984/blythemasters-says-a-bitcoin-technology-will-revolutionize-finance) (explaining that “[e]very new block is
connected to every prior one in a digital chain. So the record of every Bitcoin transaction lives on the
computers of the miners and is updated with each new entry. That's why the blockchain is also called
a distributed or a decentralized ledger. This replication makes the blockchain secure. The only way
to tamper with it would be to seize control of most of the computers holding the blockchain in their
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to gain control over the cryptocurrency that fuels the smart contract and change the
public ledger on the Ethereum block chain.34 Gaining control over a cryptocurrency is
incredibly difficult.35 Former Ethereum spokesperson Stephan Tual says gaining this
kind of control is virtually impossible.36 In an interview, Tual said building something
like The Silk Road or Wikileaks on Ethereum is possible, “(a)nd if somebody wanted to
take it down it wouldn’t be able to shut the server, because there’s no server . . . The
only thing they could do is chase every single user. Or shut down the internet—that
would work.”37
Hypothetically, with Ethereum, someone can create a social networking
application like Facebook and, rather than send advertising revenue to a Facebook
Inc., the autonomous software could send individual users advertising revenue for the
number of times their homepage has been viewed by other users. 38
One could argue that Ethereum is attempting to create a new, decentralized
Internet.39
B. Legal Liability for Copyright Infringement
This paper’s thesis is that once the Internet is decentralized, copyright holders
will have no party to sue in order to stop infringement. Since the Great
Decentralization40 has yet to occur in ways warranting significant legal action, legal
research is confined to comparisons to similar technology and analysis is confined to
theoretical conclusions.
Thus, before asking whom to sue for infringement that takes place on a
decentralized network via block chain technology, it is worth discussing how the law
has already reacted to the next closest thing: peer-to-peer file sharing.
This section of the paper explains copyright holders’ attempts to stop copyright
infringement via peer-to-peer file sharing. In the case of Ethereum and other

memories, which miners call the "51% attack." Such an assault has a better chance of materializing
in the next Bond flick than in reality.”).
34 Id.
35 See generally Fran Berkman, What is a 51 percent attack, and why are Bitcoin users freaking
out about it now?, THE DAILY DOT (Jan. 13, 2014) (http://www.dailydot.com/business/bitcoin-51percent-attack/) (explaining that in order for one entity to steal or double spend Bitcoins, that entity
would have to control more than 51% of all the computing power of the bitcoin network. Given the
massive amount of computing power in the Bitcoin Network, such a situation is not likely).
36 Gian Volpicelli, Smart Contracts Sound Boring, But They're More Disruptive Than Bitcoin,
MOTHERBOARD (Feb. 16, 2015) (http://motherboard.vice.com/read/smart-contracts-sound-boring-buttheyre-more-disruptive-than-bitcoin).
37 Id.
38 De Fillippi, (explaining that Distributed Autonomous Organizations “are autonomous entities
that subsist independently from any legal or moral entity. After they have been created and deployed
onto the internet, they no longer need (nor heed) their creators.”).
39
Taylor Gerring, Building The Centralized Web 3.0, ETHEREUM BLOG (2014)
https://blog.ethereum.org/2014/08/18/building-decentralized-web/ (writing on behalf of Ethereum’s
developers that “Ethereum sets the stage for an [sic] total sharding of traditional [Internet]
infrastructure as we know it.”).
40 My phrase.
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platforms actualizing a decentralized Internet, the block chain’s closest technological
relative is peer-to-peer networking (commonly expressed using the initialism “P2P”).4
Our modern, connected and technologically advanced society presents various
challenges for copyright owners. One such challenge exists in determining who to sue
for copyright infringement that takes place via file sharing on the Internet. In the
early days of the Internet, Internet Service Providers (ISPs) were targeted under a
theory of strict liability.4 Much has changed, as will be explained infra.
1. Liability of Software Developers for P2P Traffic
Peer-to-peer networks have traditionally enabled individuals to connect their
computers directly to other specific computers. 43 Typically, people use these
connections, or networks, to share files with one another. 44 A user first installs a free
software program that helps find specific files (like mp3s) and then downloads the
files.45 Users also share their own files with other users. 46
In Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., the Supreme Court had
to decide whether companies that distributed peer-to-peer software applications
enabling copyright infringement were liable to copyright holders.47 MGM sued
Grokster and the other defendants because they distributed “free software products
that allow computer users to share electronic files through peer-to-peer networks, so
called because users' computers communicate directly with each other, not through
central servers.”48 The court looked at Grokster’s intent, which was to attract users
who downloaded unauthorized, illegal content. 49 The court held that Grokster could
be held liable for third-party copyright infringement.50 The case was remanded and
ended up back at the District Court. Before the case returned to trial, however, two of
the parties named in the suit, Grokster and Sharman Networks, settled with MGM. 5
The final hold out was a company called StreamCast, which tried to continue its

41 De Fillippi (writing that, “blockchain-based applications also present legal, technical, and social
challenges similar to those raised by other P2P applications that came before them, such as
BitTorrent, Tor, or Freenet.”).
42 Niva Elkin-Koren, Making Technology Visible: Liability of Internet Service Providers for Peerto-Peer Traffic, NYU J.L.P.P. 15, 42 (2005) (hereinafter “Elkin-Koren”) (positing that “ISPs became a
favorite target of lawsuits by copyright owners during the mid-1990’s.”).
43 FBI, Risk of Peer-to-Peer systems, http://www.fbi.gov/scams-safety/peertopeer (last viewed Oct.
9, 2015).
44 Id.
45 Id.
46 Id.
47 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005).
48 Id. at 919-20 (2005).
49 Id. At 938 (reasoning that “anyone whose Napster or free file-sharing searches turned up a link
to Grokster would have understood Grokster to be offering the same file-sharing ability as Napster,
and to the same people who probably used Napster for infringing downloads; that would also have
been the understanding of anyone offered Grokster's suggestively named Swaptor software.”).
50 Id. (holding that “one who distributes a device with the object of promoting its use to infringe
copyright, as shown by clear expression or other affirmative steps taken to foster infringement, is
liable for the resulting acts of infringement by third parties.”).
51 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 454 F. Supp. 2d 966, 971 (C.D. Cal. 2006).
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defense against MGM.52 StreamCast lost.53 A glance at the original motions filed by
MGM show that MGM’s main goal was an injunction.54 MGM argued that “[w]hile the
award of damages for past infringement will be appropriate, there is no adequate
remedy at law in this case. Damages cannot begin to compensate Plaintiffs adequately
for the harm caused by StreamCast.”55
2. Liability of Internet Service Providers for Copyright infringement
Can an Internet Service Provider (ISP) be held vicariously liable for copyright
infringement that takes place over a peer-to-peer network? A court’s56 first reaction
to this legal issue was to say yes. 57 In Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Frena, the court held
that an online bulletin board service (BBS) infringed Playboy’s copyrights by allowing
users to upload and download Playboy’s photos. 58 The Defendant, Frena, argued that
he did not know the users were uploading and downloading these photos.59 The court
said that did not matter, holding that since, “direct evidence of copying is rarely
available in a copyright infringement action, copying may be inferentially proven by
showing that Defendant Frena had access to the allegedly infringed work, that the
allegedly infringing work is substantially similar to the copyrighted work, and that
one of the rights statutorily guaranteed to copyright owners is implicated by Frena's
actions.”60
Courts later changed course and saw that bulletin board services (BBS) did not
face vicarious liability for the acts of another on the BBS network. 61 In Religious
Technology Center v. Netcom On-Line Communication Services, Inc., a company called
Netcom provided an electronic bulletin board service.62 Users were able to upload and
share files to that bulletin.63 One of those users was a former minister of Scientology
turned vocal critic of the church.64 This minister used the bulletin board service to

Id.
Id.
54 See 454 F. Supp. 2d 966.
55 Notice of Motion and Motion for a Permanent Injunction Against Streamcast Networks, Inc.
and Musiccity Networks, Inc. at 6, Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, No. 01-08541
(C.D. Cal. 2006).
56 In terms of jurisdiction, this paper assumes any copyright claims related to decentralized
systems will be dealt with in Federal court. See, e.g. 28 U.S.C. § 1338 (2012) (stating that “[t]he district
courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action arising under any Act of Congress relating to
patents, plant variety protection, copyrights and trademarks. No State court shall have jurisdiction
over any claim for relief arising under any Act of Congress relating to patents, plant variety protection,
or copyrights.”).
57 Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Frena, 839 F. Supp. 1552, 1556 (M.D. Fla. 1993).
58 Id. at 1554.
59 Id.
60 Id.
61 Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Commc'n Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361, 1382 (N.D.
Cal. 1995) (holding that a theory of vicarious liability against a BBS operator “fails as a matter of law
because there are insufficient factual allegations to support it.”).
62 Id. at 1368.
63 Id. at 1367.
64 Id. at 1365.
52
53
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create a public, online forum to criticize the church. 65 The Church sued both the BBS
and the forum’s creator when the forum began posting portions of the church’s
copyrighted materials.66 The legal issue facing the court was, “whether the operator
of a computer bulletin board service . . . and the large Internet access provider that
allows that BBS to reach the Internet, should be liable for copyright infringement
committed by a subscriber of the BBS. 67 The court held that it was “not entirely
convinced that the mere possession of a digital copy on a BBS that is accessible to some
members of the public constitutes direct infringement by the BBS operator.” 68 This
case is seen as the turning point for law concerning the strict liability of ISPs for
copyright infringement.69 Religious Technology Center allowed ISPs to escape strict
liability because—although no knowledge of the infringement is needed for copyright
law—actionable conduct is not present when a company “simply owns a system that
others use to make copies.”70 This decision is the way courts generally allow ISPs to
escape liability for online copyright infringement.
Recognizing a need to protect innovation on the Internet, in 1998 Congress passed
the Online Copyright Infringement Liability Act (ILA), which is Title II of the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act.71 The act specifically protects ISPs from copyright
infringement suits concerning unauthorized file sharing of copyrighted material. 72
The ILA states that
A service provider shall not be liable for monetary relief, or, except as
provided in subsection (j), for injunctive or other equitable relief, for
infringement of copyright by reason of the provider's transmitting, routing,
or providing connections for, material through a system or network controlled
or operated by or for the service provider, or by reason of the intermediate
and transient storage of that material in the course of such transmitting,
routing, or providing connections . . . .73
The ILA does give copyright holders a method of working with ISPs when a
copyright infringement is detected.74 If a copyright holder spots unauthorized file
sharing, that copyright holder can contact the ISP and request action be taken. 75 Upon
notification, the ISP must quickly “remove, or disable access to, the material that is
claimed to be infringing or to be the subject of infringing activity.”76

Id.
Id.
67 Id.
68 Religious Tech. Ctr. 907 F. Supp. at 1372 (further holding that, “[o]nly the subscriber should
be liable for causing the distribution of plaintiffs' work, as the contributing actions of the BBS provider
are automatic and indiscriminate.”).
69 See Elkin-Koren at 42.
70 Id.
71 Lateef Mtima, Whom the Gods Would Destroy: Why Congress Prioritized Copyright Protection
over Internet Privacy in Passing the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 61 RUTGERS L. REV. 627 (2009).
72 Id.
73 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2012).
74 Id.
75 Id.
76 Id.
65
66
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3. Holding the Individual Liable
Because of the way that peer-to-peer file sharing works, it is difficult to hold a
single, identifiable source liable for copyright infringement. 77 Thus, with a peer-topeer copyright infringement case, the copyright holder’s best opportunity to stop
infringement is to sue the party that downloads the infringing files. 78 The Liability
Limitation Act gives copyright holders the power to obtain the identity of an individual
it believes to be downloading unauthorized files containing copyrighted material. 79
The Act says that a copyright owner may request the court issue a subpoena to an ISP
“for identification of an alleged infringer.”80 Further, ISPs, “shall expeditiously
disclose to the copyright owner . . . the information required by the subpoena.” 81
In 2010, a total of 119 potential plaintiffs received letters from their ISPs
indicating that they stand to be sued for downloading unauthorized copies of the movie
“The Hurt Locker.”82 The plaintiff, Voltage Pictures, LLC., claimed the defendants
had downloaded the movie via the peer-to-peer file sharing program BitTorrent.83 The
defendants’ various ISPs provided identifying information for the defendants in
response to subpoenas from Voltage Pictures.84
How, exactly, Voltage Pictures was able to connect ISPs to individuals who
actually downloaded the Hurt Locker is unknown. In their opposition to Defendants’
motion to quash, Voltage Pictures claims they discovered the date and time of the
unauthorized downloads, the ISP that provided Internet access to each defendant and
the unique, Internet protocol (IP) address assigned to each defendant. 85 The method
for obtaining this information is a “proprietary tracing software program” provide by
a company called Guardaley, Limited.86
III. ANALYSIS
We see from examples provided by peer-to-peer litigation that the interests of
copyright owners and the advance of technology will continue to conflict with one
another.87 As challenging as technology has been, however, copyright holders still win
cases alleging infringement liability—be it secondary liability or vicarious liability—
against some party. With block chain technology and Ethereum, software programs

See Elkin-Koren at 35.
Id.
79 17 U.S.C. § 512(h)(1).
80 Id.
81 Id.
82 Voltage Pictures, LLC v. Does 1-5,000, 818 F. Supp. 2d 28, 31 (D.D.C. 2011).
83 Id.
84 Id.
85 Plaintiff’s Opposition to Motions to Quash at 8, Voltage Pictures, LLC v. Does 1-5,000, No. 1:10cv-00873-BAH (D.D.C. 2011) (hereinafter “Voltage Motion to Quash”).
86 Voltage Motion to Quash at 8.
87 E.g. Jacqueline D. Lipton, Solving the Digital Piracy Puzzle: Disaggregating Fair Use from the
Dmca's Anti-Device Provisions, 19 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 111, 112 (2005) (writing that “[o]verzealous
enforcement of copyright laws could impede technological innovation in cryptography and file-sharing,
while under-enforcement could impede artistic innovation.”
77
78
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will exist and run across thousands of machines around the world.88 Once software
programmers have a network like Ethereum to upload their programs to, there will be
no one left upon which to pin the liability. 89 This is best illustrated with a hypothetical.
For instance, a software programmer can create a simple autonomous software
program on the Ethereum network that allows users to exchange anonymous digital
currency—like Darkcoin—for a complete PDF copy of The Hunger Games (novel). This
program, by way of its “smart contract,” can collect money and distribute unauthorized
PDFs without need for further human interaction. Because the programmer loaded
the smart contract software onto Ethereum’s peer-to-peer network, (which is
distributed among the thousands of computers connected to the network) it cannot be
shut down. Similar to the way Bitcoin’s block chain protects bitcoins from being double
spent, Ethereum’s block chain will keep software programs out of the reach of
governments, courts and corporations.
The program distributing unauthorized editions of The Hunger Games merely
exists. There is no reason to believe the original programmer would have to attach
any kind of self-identifying traces to the program, so he or she never faces liability.90
No centralized organization runs Ethereum (there is an Ethereum Foundation, which
constitutes the men and women who envisioned and built it, but once those individuals
launched the Ethereum network, they technically surrendered control).91 And because
block chain technology enables cryptographically protected exchanges, it is entirely
possible for an individual to send digital currency to the program and receive the PDF
to an encrypted server, without being traced. This leaves no close ties of liability.
Copyright holders could try to sue hardware makers for allowing these
transactions to take place on their computers, but it seems likely the courts would
shoot this down, saying that computers are used for much more than illegal file
sharing.92
Copyright holders cannot necessarily work with ISPs the same way they do when
a P2P infringement transpires. And the type of protection ISPs will get from the LLA
is unclear. Due to the cryptography protecting the identity of individual users, it is
not likely the ISPs will have the ability to trace individual users or provide the kind of
information subpoenaed in peer-to-peer cases.93
Recall that in in Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., Plaintiff
MGM chiefly wanted the successful issuance of an injunction against the entities

88 Finley; De Fillippi (reporting that “[i]nstead of being run locally, blockchain-based applications
operate globally.”).
89 De Filippi (reporting that “[e]ven though the blockchain is inherently transparent (as every
transaction is recorded on a public ledger), users can have multiple identities that don’t necessarily
relate to their real persona.”).
90 Supra note 89.
91 Ethereum, Foundation, https://www.ethereum.org/foundation (last viewed Oct. 9, 2015)
(stating that the “Ethereum Foundation is a non-profit organization registered in Switzerland, and
has the purpose of managing the funds that were raised from the Ether Sale in order to best serve the
Ethereum and decentralized technology ecosystem.”).
92 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 446 (1984) (holding that the
business of supplying the equipment that makes copying of television programs feasible “should not
be stifled simply because the equipment is used by some individuals to make unauthorized
reproductions of respondents' works.”).
93 Supra note 89.
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enabling unauthorized copying of MGM’s property.94 In a decentralized environment
such as Ethereum, a software programmer can upload a decentralized autonomous
program such as the one hypothesized about Supra, and hide his identity behind
cryptography.95 This makes an injunction feckless for it would be against an unknown
party. Additionally, an injunction would not be enforceable because the program would
exist on thousands of machines dispersed throughout the world. So, theoretically, you
can destroy one machine hosting the hypothetical Hunger Games-selling program, but
the program will exist on thousands of other machines.
IV. CONCLUSION AND PROPOSAL
To conclude, it appears as though a future, decentralized Web might prove
challenging for copyright lawyers. Some may argue in favor of such dramatic social
change, claiming that copyright laws tend to prohibit the spread of culture and
knowledge.96 Others, however, would point out that unregulated online copyright
infringement would discourage artists and scholars from creating and producing. 97
The uncertainties spawned by technological advances are inescapable. As has
been suggested supra, the potential for copyright abuse is very real with the
implementation of a decentralized Internet. Additionally, the absence of any realistic
method of enjoining an infringer on a decentralized Internet poses new challenges for
copyright holders and IP attorneys.98
I propose that copyright holders take advantage of the new technology. By
offering licensing at an attractive price, copyright holders could inspire a culture that
encourages software developers working in a decentralized regime to embrace the legal
use of protected materials. By openly encouraging the authorized use of copyrighted
materials, copyright holders will also encourage the growth of decentralized
autonomous software programs that they support. 99 By definition, a decentralized
94 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 913 (2005) (summarizing
that “[s]eeking damages and an injunction, a group of movie studios and other copyright
holders . . . sued respondents for their users' copyright infringements.”).
95 Supra note 89.
96 See Generally MICHELE BOLDRIN & DAVID K. LEVINE, AGAINST INTELLECTUAL MONOPOLY
(Cambridge University Press, 2008) (arguing that the “monopoly over useful inventions creates
intellectual inefficiency because it also blocks the development of other potentially useful
inventions.”).
97 Elliot M. Abramson, How Much Copying Under Copyright? Contradictions, Paradoxes,
Inconsistencies, 61 TEMP. L. REV. 133, 134-35 (1988) (arguing that the “underlying premise of
copyright law is that progress of the arts is promoted by granting talented creators exclusive control
over their creations, and the economic rewards they generate.”).
98 Cf. Ben Depoorter, Technology and Uncertainty: The Shaping Effect on Copyright Law, 157 U.
PA. L. REV. 1831, 1835 (2009) (opining that “copyright law is greatly influenced by technological
change.”).
99 James Gibson, Risk Aversion and Rights Accretion in Intellectual Property Law, 116 YALE L.J.
882, 887 (2007) (laying out a theory that “the players in key copyright industries tend to be risk-averse,
a tendency exacerbated by high upfront investments and the need to satisfy conservative insurers and
downstream distributors,” that “these factors cause copyright users to seek licenses even when they
have a good fair use claim—i.e., even when proceeding unlicensed would probably result in no liability”
and that the “result is a steady, incremental, and unintended expansion of copyright, caused by
nothing more than ambiguous doctrine and prudent behavior on the part of copyright users.”).
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network is self-regulating. By instilling, early on, the notion that use licenses can be
obtained at a reasonable cost to developers of decentralized applications, copyright
holders may stand to influence the decentralized culture in their favor. If they wait
and miss out on the opportunity to embrace and profit from a decentralized network,
copyright holders may be reduced to disgruntled entities seeking feckless injunctions;
portrayed as mean spirited, centralized corporations hunting down potential claims on
a property right rendered ethereal by new technology.

